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1. Introduction 
Explanations for economic growth have generally been restricted to the realm of mac-
roeconomics (Romer, 1990; Krugman, 1991). However, a different scholarly tradition linking 
growth to industrial organization dates back at least to Schumpeter (1934). According to this 
tradition, performance, measured in terms of economic growth, is shaped by the degree to 
which the industry structure most efficiently utilizes scarce resources. But what determines this 
optimal structure? There is a long-standing tradition in the field of industrial organization de-
voted towards identifying the determinants of industry structure (Scherer and Ross, 1990; 
Chandler, 1990). As early as 1948, Blair (1948, p. 121) remarked that, “The whole subject of 
the comparative efficiency of different sizes of business has long raised one of the most per-
plexing dilemmas in the entire body of economic theory.…But a beginning must be made 
sometime in tackling this whole size-efficiency problem on an empirical basis. The first step in 
any such undertaking would logically be that of studying the underlying technological forces of 
the economy, since it is technology which largely determines the relationship between the size 
of plant and efficiency.” Scherer and Ross (1990) and Chandler (1990) expand the determi-
nants of optimal industry structure to include other factors as well as the underlying technology. 
This leads Dosi (1988, p. 1157), in his systematic review of the literature in the Journal of 
Economic Literature, to conclude that “Each production activity is characterized by a particu-
lar distribution of firms.” 
When the determinants of the underlying industrial structure are stable, the industry 
structure itself would not be expected to change. However, as Chandler (1990), Scherer and 
Ross (1990) and Dosi (1988) emphasize, a change in the underlying determinants would be 
expected to result in a change in the optimal industry structure. Certainly, Chandler (1990) and 
Scherer and Ross (1990) identified a shift in optimal industry structure towards increased 
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centralization and concentration throughout the first two-thirds of the previous century as a re-
sult of changes in the underlying technology along with other factors. 
More recently, a series of studies has identified a change in the determinants underly-
ing the industry structure that has reversed this trend. The most salient point of this change is 
that technology, globalization, deregulation, labor supply, variety in demand, and the resulting 
higher levels of uncertainty have rendered a shift in the industry structure away from greater 
concentration and centralization towards less concentration and decentralization. A series of 
empirical studies (Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991; Acs and Audretsch, 1993; Acs et al., 
1999) have uncovered two systematic findings regarding the response of industry structure to 
changes in the underlying determinants. The first is that the industry structure is generally shift-
ing towards an increased role for small enterprises. The second is that the extent and timing 
of this shift is anything but identical across countries. Rather, the shift in industry structures has 
been heterogeneous and apparently shaped by country-specific factors (Carree et al., 1999; 
Thurik, 1996 and 1999). Apparently, institutions and policies in certain countries have facili-
tated a greater and more rapid response to globalization and technological change, along 
with the other underlying factors, by shifting to a less centralized industry structure than has 
been the case in other countries. An implication of this high variance in industry restructuring 
is that some countries are likely to have industry structures that are different from “optimal”. 
While the evidence suggests that the restructuring paths of industry vary considerably 
across countries, virtually nothing is known about the consequences of lagging behind in this 
process. Do countries with an industry structure that deviates considerably from the optimal 
industry structure forfeit growth more than countries deviating less from the optimal industry 
structure? This question is crucial to policy makers, because if the opportunity cost, measured 
in terms of forgone growth, of a slow adjustment towards the optimal industry structure is low, 
the consequences of not engaging in a rapid adjustment process are relatively trivial. How-
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ever, if the opportunity cost is high the consequences are more alarming. The purpose of this 
paper is to identify the impact of deviations in the actual industry structure from the optimal in-
dustry structure on growth. 
In the second section of this paper, the shift in industry structure away from more to 
less concentrated production is documented and underlying explanations provided. In the 
third section, we use a data base linking industry structure to growth rates for a panel of 18 
European countries spanning five years to test the hypothesis that deviations from the optimal 
industry structure result in reduced growth rates. Finally, in the last section conclusions are 
provided. In particular, we find that deviations from the optimal industry structure, measured in 
terms of the relative importance of small firms, have had an adverse effect on economic 
growth rates. 
2. The Shift in Industry Structure 
A wide range of studies identified systematic evidence documenting two imposing 
characteristics of industry structure over the first two-thirds of the previous century (Scherer 
and Ross, 1990; Chandler, 1990). The first is that the degree of centralization of production 
was steadily increasing over time. The second is that production was at its highest point of 
centralization and concentration in the 1970s. This reflected underlying technological and de-
mand characteristics rendering large-scale production and organization more efficient. 
Giant corporations were seen as the sole and most powerful engine of economic and 
technological progress in the early post war period. Schumpeter (1950) provided an image of 
large corporations gaining the competitive advantage over small and new ones and of giant 
corporations ultimately dominating the entire economic landscape. This advantage would be 
due to scale economies in the production of new economic and technological knowledge. 
These scale economies would result from the organization of teams of highly trained special-
 5
ists working on technological progress in a routinized fashion. The large corporation was 
thought to have both superior production efficiency and superior innovative efficacy. Galbraith 
(1956) pointed out that in his world of countervailing power large corporations are superior to 
small ones in nearly every aspect of economic behavior like productivity, technological ad-
vance, compensation and job security. In his world all major societal institutions contributed to 
the maintenance of the stability and predictability needed for mass production. In these worlds 
of Schumpeter and Galbraith there is little room for small scale, experimenting firms thriving 
on the uncertainty of technological advance, whimsical markets and the individual energy of 
an obstinate entrepreneur. Only large industrial units were thought to be able to compete on 
global markets producing global products.  
The exploitation of economies of scale and scope was thought to be at the heart of dic-
tating an industry structure characterized by concentration and centralization (Teece, 1993). 
Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of investment in production, distribution, and man-
agement needed to exploit economies of scale and scope. Audretsch stresses the influence 
the image of the East-European economies and the perceived Soviet threat had on Western 
policy makers. “The fear in the West was not only that the accumulation of economic assets 
would lead to unprecedented productivity in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; of even 
greater concern was the assumed leaps and bounds in technological progress that would 
emerge from the huge and concentrated research and development programs being assem-
bled. From the vantage point of the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the West seemed not only 
on the verge of losing the space race, but perhaps even more important, the economic growth 
race” (Audretsch, 1995, p. 2). It was a period of relatively well-defined technological trajecto-
ries, of a stable demand and of seemingly clear advantages of diversification. Audretsch and 
Thurik (1997) characterize this period as one where stability, continuity and homogeneity 
were the cornerstones and label it the managed economy. Small businesses were consid-
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ered to be a vanishing breed. 
Perhaps it was the demise of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union that made it clear that concentration and centralization were no longer the 
cornerstones of the most efficient industry structure. At the same time, more and more evi-
dence became available that economic activity moved away from large firms to small, pre-
dominantly young firms. Brock and Evans (1989) provided an extensive documentation of the 
changing role of small business in the U.S. economy. They were the first to attempt to under-
stand these new developments filling the void of economic research concerning formation, 
dissolution and growth of businesses and concerning the differential impact of regulations 
across business size classes. The new role of small firms and their new interaction with large 
ones is described in Nooteboom (1994). Various authors have provided empirical evidence 
for this new role. Blau (1987) showed that the proportion of self-employed in the U.S. labor 
force began to rise in the late 1970s. Acs and Audretsch (1993) and Carlsson (1992) pro-
vided a survey of evidence concerning manufacturing industries in countries in varying stages 
of economic development. Acs (1996) shows that the self-employment rate in OECD coun-
tries declined until 1977 and increased between then and 1987.1 Carlsson (1989) showed 
that the share of the Fortune 500 in total manufacturing employment dropped from 79% in 
1975 to 73% in 1985. In the same period the share of these firms in total manufacturing ship-
ments dropped from 83% to 78%. More recently, he shows that the share of the Fortune 500 
dropped to 58% in 1996 and the latter to 75% (Carlsson, 1999). 
                                                 
 
1 See also Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and Carree et al. (1999). 
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Table 1: Business owners per labor force in 23 OECD countries  
    Level   Growth   country share in total business 
      owners   
  1974 1986 1998 1986-74 1998-86 1974 1986 1998 
Austria 0.081 0.066 0.080 -0.015 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.007 
Belgium 0.100 0.106 0.119 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 
Denmark 0.081 0.063 0.064 -0.018 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.004 
Finland 0.062 0.066 0.082 0.004 0.015 0.005 0.004 0.005 
France 0.109 0.098 0.085 -0.011 -0.012 0.080 0.062 0.049 
Germany (West) 0.073 0.069 0.085 -0.004 0.016 0.066 0.053 0.076 
Greece* 0.173 0.182 0.186 0.009 0.003 0.019 0.018 0.018 
Ireland 0.073 0.078 0.112 0.004 0.034 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Italy 0.144 0.167 0.182 0.023 0.015 0.095 0.098 0.095 
Luxembourg* 0.100 0.078 0.059 -0.022 -0.019 0.001 0.000 0.000 
The Netherlands 0.097 0.082 0.104 -0.015 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.018 
Portugal* 0.110 0.108 0.152 -0.002 0.044 0.014 0.013 0.017 
Spain 0.116 0.115 0.130 -0.001 0.015 0.051 0.042 0.048 
Sweden 0.071 0.066 0.082 -0.005 0.016 0.009 0.008 0.008 
United Kingdom 0.077 0.089 0.109 0.012 0.020 0.066 0.065 0.070 
Iceland 0.102 0.099 0.132 -0.004 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway 0.092 0.084 0.071 -0.008 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.004 
Switzerland 0.065 0.070 0.091 0.005 0.021 0.008 0.007 0.008 
USA 0.082 0.103 0.103 0.021 0.000 0.252 0.319 0.319 
Japan 0.127 0.125 0.100 -0.002 -0.024 0.222 0.195 0.151 
Canada 0.075 0.100 0.141 0.025 0.041 0.025 0.035 0.049 
Australia 0.137 0.165 0.155 0.028 -0.011 0.027 0.033 0.032 
New Zealand 0.098 0.110 0.142 0.012 0.032 0.005 0.005 0.006 
Average 0.098 0.100 0.111         
total business owners in thousands       30,337 38,446 44,927 
       
Note: The source of the data are OECD figures (which exclude agriculture), adapted by EIM to have improve 
upon international comparability. A star (*) for 1998 means provisional. Germany is West-Germany for 1974 and 
1986. 
There has been considerable documentation of the shift in the structure of American 
industry (Carlsson, 1999; Brock and Evans, 1989). Unfortunately, similar documentation for 
Europe has not been possible due to the absence of systematic data that is comparable 
across countries. However, Eurostat has begun to publish yearly summaries of the firm size 
distribution of EU-members at the two-digit industry level for the entire private sector, see Eu-
rostat (1994 and 1996). The efforts of Eurostat are currently being supplemented by the Euro-
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pean Network of SME Research (ENSR), a co-operation of 18 European institutes. This or-
ganization publishes a yearly report of the structure and the developments of the enterprise 
and establishment populations in the countries of the European Union.2 
International data on business owners per labor force (excluding agriculture) for 23 
OECD countries are derived by EIM from OECD and additional data sources. The number of 
business owners, as a share of the labor force, the ‘rate of entrepreneurship’, is identified for 
each of these countries between 1974 and 1998.3 Table 1 shows that the countries with the 
lowest rate of business ownership in 1998 are Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway. These 
countries have in common that they are small and that the rate of business ownership is below 
8% in 1998. The sample average in 1994 is 11%. There are two countries with a business 
ownership rate in excess of 16%: Greece and Italy. Note that these are Mediterranean coun-
tries. The number of business owners in the 23 countries grew from about 30 million in 1974 
                                                 
 
2 See the various editions of European Observatory which provide an account of the state of 
small business in Europe like, for instance, EIM (1997). 
3 Data sources include the OECD Labour Force Statistics 1978-1998. EIM completed the 
missing data by using ratios derived from various other sources. Furthermore, EIM made a unified 
data set of business owners as the definitions of business owners or self-employed in the OECD 
statistics are not fully compatible between countries. In some countries business owners are de-
fined as individuals owning a business that is not legally incorporated. In other countries, 
owner/managers of an incorporated business (OMIBs) who gain profits as well as a salary are con-
sidered owners too. There are also countries who classify a part of the OMIBs as self-employed 
and another part as employee. This has to do with the way in which labour force surveys are set up 
in different countries. This topic is dealt with in Chapter 5 of the OECD Employment Outlook (June 
2000). By and large, Australia, Japan, Norway and U.S. use a narrow business ownership definition 
(excluding OMIBs or excluding most OMIBs), while the other countries apply a broader characteri-
zation (including OMIBs or including most OMIBs). For the countries not following the broadest defi-
nition (including OMIBs), EIM made an estimation of the number of OMIBs using information derived 
from the European Observatory (KPMG, 2000), or, for the non-European countries, using informa-
tion from domestic sources. Another difference in definition is that for some countries unpaid family 
workers are included in the self-employment data as well, mostly for ancient years. For these 
years, the unpaid family workers were eliminated from the data by using ratios from more recent 
years for which separate data on unpaid family workers are available. Finally, for countries where 
important trend breaks occur, these trend breaks were corrected for. Data on the labour force are 
also from the OECD Labour Force Statistics 1978-1998. Again, some missing data have been filled 
up from various other sources. Contact André van Stel of EIM for further information about these 
data (ast@eim.nl). The data set is referred to as COMPENDIA 2000.1 
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to about 45 million in 1998. The proportional growth of the labor force has been lower in this 
period so that the rate of business ownership increased, on average, from 10% to 11%. 
Clearly, the U.S. is the country with the highest number of business owners: nearly 32% 
of the total 45 million business owners in the 23 countries in 1998 are in the U.S. Countries 
with a business ownership growth of more than 3 percentage points in the period of 1986 
through 1998 are Canada, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand and Portugal. Three of these five 
countries experienced a growth of the business ownership rate also in the previous period of 
1974 through 1986. There are four countries suffering a decline in the business ownership 
rate in both periods: France, Luxembourg, Norway and Japan. The decline in Japan is 
particularly noteworthy since its share in total business owners dropped from more than 20% 
in 1974 to 15% in 1998. 
Carlsson (1992) offers two explanations for the shift in the industry structure away from 
large corporations and towards small enterprises. The first deals with fundamental changes 
occurring in the world economy from the 1970s onwards. These changes relate to the intensi-
fication of global competition, the increase in the degree of uncertainty and the growth in mar-
ket fragmentation. The second deals with changes in the character of technological progress. 
He shows that flexible automation has had various effects resulting in a shift from large to 
smaller firms. The shift in the nature of technological change particularly involving flexible 
automation facilitated product differentiation and led to a new division of labor involving more 
cooperation and less competition between large and small firms. Piore and Sabel (1984) ar-
gue that in the 1970s firms and policy makers were unable to maintain the conditions neces-
sary to preserve mass production. Mass production was based upon the input of special-
purpose machines and of semi-skilled workers and the output of standardized products. A 
fundamental change in the path of technological development led to the occurrence of vast 
diseconomies of scale. This market instability resulted in the demise of mass production and 
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promoted flexible specialization. Piore and Sabel use the term Industrial Divide for the “re-
versal of the trend” from that toward more large firms to that toward more small ones. Jensen 
(1993) refers to the Third Industrial Revolution when describing the same phenomenon. 
Meredith (1987) discusses the advantages of a range of recently developed flexible produc-
tion techniques for small-scaled enterprises. Audretsch and Thurik (2000) point at the role 
knowledge plays when explaining the shift from the managed economy to the entrepreneurial 
economy. 
This shift away from large firms is not confined to manufacturing industries. Brock and 
Evans (1989) show that this trend has been economy-wide, at least for the United States. 
They offer four additional reasons as to why this shift has occurred: (1) the increase of labor 
supply; (2) changes in consumer tastes; (3) relaxation of (entry) regulations and (4) the fact 
that we are in a period of creative destruction. Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) stress the 
influence of two other trends of industrial restructuring: decentralization and vertical disintegra-
tion of large companies and the formation of new business communities. Furthermore, they 
emphasize the role of private and public policies promoting the small business sector.4 
The extent to which this shift in industry structure has influenced economic performance 
has received limited attention. This has to do with a persistent lack in knowledge of market 
structure dynamics (Audretsch, 1995). In other words, there is a lack in knowledge concerning 
questions like who enters and exits, what determines this mobility and what are its effects, in 
particular on economic performance. Here we are concerned with a key question in econom-
ics: why do industries or economies grow? As discussed earlier, traditionally, the prevalent 
assumption was that large enterprises are at the heart of the process of innovation and crea-
                                                 
 
4 See also Carree (1997) and Carree et al. (1999) for literature surveys of the determinants 
of the shift away from a managed and toward an entrepreneurial economy. 
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tion of welfare. This assumption is generally referred to as the Schumpeterian Hypothesis. 
Recently, the focus of attention has shifted towards whether the process of decentralization 
and deconcentration, which virtually every industrialized country has experienced in the last 
two decades, has had positive welfare implications. Audretsch (1995) calls this shift in orien-
tation of our social-economic thinking ‘the new learning’. 
The link between the shift in the industry structure and subsequent growth can be inves-
tigated in two distinct ways. First, by investigating the range of consequences of the shift in 
the locus of economic activity. For instance, one may study whether this shift has been favor-
able to the rejuvenation of industries and the process of (radical) innovation.5 Alternatively, one 
may focus on the importance of the role of small firms in enhancing competition.6 A yet differ-
ent perspective on the link between the shifting industry structure and performance has been 
to examine the relationship between small firms and job creation.7 Lastly, the role of small 
firms as a vehicle for entrepreneurship has been the focal point for a series of studies. For 
example, Baumol (1990) provides an extensive account of the role that entrepreneurial activi-
ties and their consequences for prosperity play throughout history. Acs (1992) brings it all to-
gether in a short descriptive manner in a survey of some consequences of the shift of eco-
nomic activity from large to smaller businesses. He claims that small firms play an important 
role in the economy as they are agents of change by their entrepreneurial activity, as they are 
a source of considerable innovative activity, as they stimulate industry evolution and as they 
                                                 
 
5 See Acs and Audretsch (1990), Audretsch (1995) and Cohen and Klepper (1992 and 
1996). 
6 See Audretsch (1993, 1995), Oughton and Whittam (1997) and You (1995). Nickell (1996), 
Nickell et al. (1997) and Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) present evidence that competition, as 
measured by an increased number of competitors, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor 
productivity growth. 
7 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) and Carree and Klomp (1996) provide some insights 
in the relationship between small firms and job creation. 
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create an important share of the newly generated jobs. 
A second way to answer the question of how changes in the industry structure impact 
performance is to circumvent the intermediary variables of technological change, entrepre-
neurship, competitiveness and job generation to investigate a direct empirical link between 
the shift and performance measures at the industry or economy-wide level. Some preliminary 
empirical results of the relation between changes in the firm size distribution and economic 
growth are presented in Thurik (1996). His analysis lacks a theoretical component but pro-
vides some indication of an increase in the economy-wide share of small firms positively af-
fecting subsequent growth. Schmitz (1989) presents an endogenous growth model relating 
entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. An important implication of his model is that the 
equilibrium fraction of entrepreneurs is lower than the social optimal level, providing a ration-
ale for policies stimulating entrepreneurial activity. Some evidence of a well-established his-
torical (long-term) relationship between fluctuations in entrepreneurship and the rise and fall of 
nations is assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). In this respect we also mention the 
work of Eliasson (1995) on economic growth through competitive selection. He demonstrates 
that such a relation may be characterized by significant time lags up to a couple of decades. 
There is more evidence on the relation between size class distributions and economic per-
formance.8  
The evaluation of the various consequences of the shift in the locus of economic activ-
ity is necessary to establish whether it is desirable and whether it should be promoted by 
economic policy. However, this evaluation is complicated because none of these conse-
quences is, in fact, independent of the other three and because the evaluation offers some-
                                                 
 
8 Acs et al. (1999) point at differences in competition and entrepreneurship when comparing 
the more successful U.S. economy to that of Europe and Japan. 
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thing of a series of trade-offs. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) contrast the most fundamental 
elements of the newly emerging entrepreneurial economy with those of the managed econ-
omy by identifying fifteen trade-offs that are essential for these two polar worlds. For instance, 
while total employment may rise due to new start-ups and declining average firm sizes, the 
lower average wages that small firms pay, may at least partly offset the welfare effect induced 
by the employment growth. By following the second way we are able to investigate whether 
there has been an overall growth-enhancing effect of the shift in the locus of economic activity 
from ‘large’ to ‘small’. 
3. Estimating the Growth Penalty 
In this section we test the hypothesis that the extent of the gap between the actual in-
dustry structure and the optimal industry structure influences subsequent growth. We start with 
the assumption that a country’s growth can be decomposed into two components -- growth 
that would have occurred with an optimal industry structure, and the impact on growth occur-
ring from any actual deviations from that optimal industry structure. This can be represented 
by 
(1)  *ccp
*
cpcp SFPSFPGNPGNP --D=D -1g , 
where the dependent variable is the actual rate of economic growth. *cpGNPD  is the rate 
of economic growth in country c in the case where the actual industry structure ( cpSFP ) is at the 
optimal level at the start of the period p. For ease of exposition we assume that the optimal 
industry structure in a country remains constant for the total period under investigation. This is 
not vital to our analysis. Since we are considering only short-term periods (maximum five 
years) this may be a reasonable assumption. 
Industry structure is multidimensional and spans a broad array of characteristics that 
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defy measurement by a single statistic. However, as explained elsewhere (Audretsch and 
Thurik, 2000 and 2001), the most salient characteristic driving the shift in industry structure 
from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy is that the relative role of small and entre-
preneurial firms has increased. Thus, we capture changes in industry structures by changes in 
the relative importance of small firms. 
In equation (1) the parameter g  is positive. Deviations of the actual industry structure 
from the optimal industry structure negatively affect economic growth, both when the industry 
structure consists of too few or too many small firms. In either case there is a deviation from 
the optimal industry structure and number of small firms. Taking the first difference of equation 
(1) we obtain 
(2)  ( )*ccp*ccp*cpcpcp SFPSFPSFPSFPGNPGNPGNP ----DD+D=D --- 211 g . 
In case both 1-cpSFP  and 2-cpSFP  are above the optimal small-firm share, the expres-
sion between brackets reduces to 1-D cpSFP . Indeed, in case the small-firm share is too high, 
adding small firms to the industry structure reduces economic growth. In case both 1-cpSFP  
and 2-cpSFP  are below the optimal small-firm share, the expression between brackets reduces 
to 1-D- cpSFP . An increase in the small firm share when this presence is below optimal en-
hances economic performance. Therefore, the sign of the parameter of 1-D cpSFP  reflects 
whether the small firm presence is below or above the optimal levels for the countries under 
consideration. In case the parameter is negative, the industry structure consists of too many 
small firms. In case the parameter is positive, the reverse holds and the industry structure 
consists of too few small firms. 
We will denote the parameter of 1-D cpSFP  as k . Note that this is not the same parame-
ter as g , since the sign of k  is dependent on whether the actual small-firm share is above or 
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below the optimal one. So, k  can be both positive and negative whereas g  is necessarily 
positive. 
We make some further assumptions to transform equation (2) into an equation that can 
be estimated using the data at hand. First, we approximate 1-D cpSFP  by 11 -- D-D cpcp LFSF  , the 
difference between the growth of small firms and large firms in terms of value-of-shipments. 
Second, we assume that *cpGNPD  is idiosyncratic with respect to time and country. Therefore 
country dummies and time dummies (the last to correct for European wide business cycle ef-
fects) are included. Thus, *cpGNPDD  is approximated by time dummies only because the coun-
try dummies drop out when taking first differences. Third, we add an error term cpe . Summa-
rizing we have 
(3) cpcpcp
P
p
ppcpcp eLFSFDGNPGNP +D-D++D=D --
=
- å )( 11
1
1 kb , 
where pD  denote dummy variables for periods Pp ,...,1= . Factors specific to each 
time period are reflected by pb . A high value of this parameter indicates an unexplained in-
crease in the extent of economic growth. In case of a low pb  the reverse holds. The contribu-
tion of the shift in the size class distribution of firms to the percentage growth of GNP is repre-
sented by k . The influence of this shift on GNP growth is lagged. This implies that Pp ,...,1=  
runs from 1990 through 1994 when applying equation (3) to our European data set. 
To estimate equation (3), we use data provided by the European Observatory (EIM, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997). The European Observatory provides data on the annual 
percentage growth of real gross value added of the private sector, the annual percentage 
growth of value-of-shipments of small- and medium-sized firms (with employment less than 
200 employees), as well as the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of large firms 
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(with employment of at least 200 employees). These data are available for five years (1989 
through 1993) for all fifteen member countries of the European Union (Europe-15), Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland (including Liechtenstein). 
Hence, our European data set consists of a total of 90 (18 countries times five years) 
observations. However, Germany had to be omitted for the entire period. Germany’s then re-
cent unification led to specific economic perturbations that render it inappropriate for inclusion 
in the estimation model. The remaining 85 observations are used for computing the regres-
sion coefficients. The period 1990-1994 is characterized by relatively vehement cyclical 
movements with 1992 being a recession year and 1994 being a year with an exceptional 
strong recovery. 
In Table 2 the regression results for the period 1990-1994 are presented. Equation (3) 
does not contain country dummies. The ‘mean’ country effect is reflected by coefficient a  
while 1991D  is left out of all computations to avoid full multicollinearity
9. The two dummy vari-
ables with a significant contribution are 1993D  and 1994D . This presumably reflects the strong 
economic recovery after the recession of 1992. We present both results with all time dummies 
included and with the two insignificant dummies excluded. In the first part of Table 2 weighted 
least squares results are presented, with total employment as the weighting variable. In the 
second part of the table ordinary least squares results are presented. 
In each of the cases we find a significantly positive coefficient (at the 5% significance 
level) for k . Its value ranges from 0.55 for the first column of Table 2 to 0.92 for the last col-
umn. 
                                                 
 
9 So, instead of estimating coefficients for all P time dummies as suggested by equation (3), 
we actually estimate P-1 dummy coefficients and a constant term a . 
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The empirical evidence suggests that the consequences for economic growth of not 
shifting the industry structure away from large business towards smaller ones are rather large. 
However, this result is qualified by the large standard deviation of the coefficient for k . An-
other important qualification to these results is that measurement of the variables includes a 
number of estimates. Follow-up studies are required for corroboration of these results10. Still, 
k  is found to be significantly positive in all computations. We conclude that, based on the 
empirical findings, there is evidence that on average those countries that have experienced a 
shift in their industry structures away from large firms and towards small firms have also ex-
perienced greater economic growth, at least for a sample of Western European countries 
over a recent time period. Since our interpretation is that this shift is an indicator of the stage 
of the transition of the economy from a managed one to an entrepreneurial one, we conclude 
that European countries that progress on this transition track seem to have been rewarded 
with additional growth. 
One has to be careful interpreting the estimation results for different countries. The es-
timated positive value of k  must be viewed as an average value of the (unobserved) ck ’s of 
the different countries. So, the positive value found for k  does not mean that in all countries in 
the sample an increase in small-firm presence is rewarded with additional growth. There may 
be countries in the sample where small-firm presence is indeed above the optimal level and 
                                                 
 
10 Carree and Thurik (1998, 1999 and 2000) provide complementary analyses showing the 
consequence of lagging behind in this restructuring process in manufacturing. Using a sample of 14 
manufacturing industries in 13 European countries and 13 manufacturing industries in 12 European 
countries, respectively, they find that, on average, the employment share of large firms in 1990 has 
had a negative effect on growth of output in the subsequent four-year period. Thurik (1996) shows 
that the percentage growth of GNP is explained using a structural shift. This shift is captured by the 
difference between the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of large firms (with em-
ployment of at least 500 employees) and the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of 
small firms (with employment of less than 500 employees), using data for three distinct time peri-
ods: 1988-1990, 1989-1992 and 1990-1993 for all twelve old member countries of the European Un-
ion. 
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consequently, a further increase in the number of small firms leads to a growth penalty instead 
of a growth reward. The estimation results do imply, however, that for the majority of countries 
in the sample, the number of small firms was too low in the period under consideration. In 
translating the positive value of k  in terms of implications for different countries, policy mak-
ers should compare small-firm presence in their own country with that in surrounding coun-
tries. If SFP  is relatively low, small-firm presence is expected below optimum, given the posi-
tive value of k . On the other hand, if SFP  is relatively high, small-firm presence is not neces-
sarily below optimum, despite the estimated k  being positive. 
 19
Table 2: Regression results for equation (3): relating growth to structure1, 2 
 Weighted least squares3 Ordinary least squares 
a  -0.93 
(-2.30) 
-0.79 
(-3.38) 
-1.22 
(-1.84) 
-0.97 
(-2.56) 
1990b  0.52 
(0.89) 
 0.39 
(0.41) 
 
1992b  -0.08 
(-0.14) 
 0.37 
(0.39) 
 
1993b  1.32 
(2.26) 
1.20 
(2.50) 
2.19 
(2.32) 
1.94 
(2.53) 
1994b  4.35 
(7.40) 
4.25 
(8.74) 
4.72 
(4.91) 
4.48 
(5.65) 
k  0.55 
(2.14) 
0.63 
(2.58) 
0.91 
(2.20) 
0.92 
(2.27) 
R2 0.441 0.422 0.318 0.317 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.401 0.275 0.291 
DW 2.05 2.04 1.72 1.72 
N 85 85 85 85 
1 Regression for 17 European countries over the period 1990-1994 
2 DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. T-values between parentheses 
3 Weighting variable for WLS is total employment 
 
The regression results are illustrated using Figure 1. We have grouped the growth-
acceleration observations, 1-D-D=DD cpcp GNPGNPGNP , on the basis of the degree to which 
the value-of-shipments shifted from large to small firms. That is, the GNPDD  observations 
have been sorted in order of the values of the (lagged) structural change variable, 
LFSF D-D . Both variables have been computed in deviation of the mean per year in order to 
correct for specific year effects. The 85 observations have been divided in 5 groups of 17 ob-
servations. The averages of both LFSF D-D  and GNPDD  are displayed in Figure 1. We 
see that, on average, a larger shift toward smallness is associated with a higher growth ac-
celeration. Existing growth differences between countries do not disappear because of a 
change in structure, at least not in a period as short as our regression period. The derivation 
of our regression equation (3) shows that we have assumed optimal growth *GNPD  to be 
idiosyncratic per country. However, the changes in structure do affect growth rates within 
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countries and this is exactly what is illustrated by the sorted growth acceleration averages in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Growth accelerations and the relative shift toward small firms1 
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1 Averages of 5 groups of growth acceleration values, grouped on the basis of the degree of change toward 
small firms, in deviation of means per year 
5. Conclusions 
A large literature has linked the structure of industries to performance. However, little is 
known about the consequences of deviating from the “optimal” industry structure. The evi-
dence provided in this paper suggests that, in fact, there is a cost of not adjusting industry 
structure towards the “optimal”. This cost is measured in terms of forgone economic growth. 
Most developed countries have experienced a shift towards a more decentralized in-
dustry structure in the last several decades. The magnitude of this shift and speed of adjust-
ment varies considerably across countries. The evidence suggests that those countries that 
have shifted industry structure towards decentralization in a more rapid fashion have been re-
warded by higher growth rates. 
Our analysis is based upon whether excess growth of small firms over their larger 
counterparts has led to additional macro-economic growth for member countries of the Euro-
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pean Union in the early 1990. The results of this investigation are meant to supplement the in-
tuition of many policymakers that the changes in industrial structure have had some real ef-
fects on economic performance.  
European public policy has been preoccupied with generating economic growth and 
reducing unemployment. The resulting policy debate has typically focused on macroeconomic 
policies and instruments. The results of this paper suggest that an additional set of instru-
ments may also be valuable in generating growth – policies focusing on allowing the industry 
structure to adjust. As the evidence shows, just as countries reluctant to shift their industry 
structures will be penalized by lower growth rates, those nations able to harness the forces of 
technology and globalization by transforming their industry structures are rewarded by growth 
dividends. 
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